Armstrong 4: Documents by Date

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Andrew H. Wilson, SBN #063209
WILSON, RYAN & CAMPILONGO
115 San some St., 4th Floor
San Francisco, California 94104
(415) 391-3900
Telefax: (415) 954-0938

Laurie J. Bartilson, SBN #139220
MOXON & BARTILSON
6255 Sunset Boulevard, Suite 2000
Hollywood, CA 90028
(213) 960-1936
Telefax: (213) 953-3351

Attorneys for Cross-Defendant
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF MARIN

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL, a California not-for-profit
religious corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

GERALD ARMSTRONG, et al.,

Defendants.

AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS

) CASE NO. 157 680

)

) [CONSOLIDATED]

)

) CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
) INTERNATIONAL’S REPLY IN
) SUPPORT OF RENEWAL MOTION
) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
) DEFENDANT GERALD
) ARMSTRONG’S CROSS-
) COMPLAINT
)

) Date: March 8, 1996
) Time: 9:00 a.m.

) Dept: 1

)

) Trial Date: Vacated

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I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Church of Scientology International ("the Church") seeks
summary judgment of defendant Armstrong’s single remaining cross-claim, for declaratory
relief, and thus an end to this litigation. In its moving papers, the Church demonstrated that
this Court had already determined the enforceability of most of the provisions of the contract
concerning which Armstrong seeks a declaration, that there is no existing controversy as to
the remaining paragraphs, and that the paragraphs are, in any case, enforceable as a matter
of law. Armstrong’s opposition consists of (1) wholesale repetition of his argument that the
enforcement of the agreement (at all) violates his First Amendment rights; (2) a declaration
that this Court has "misinterpreted" the agreement; and (3) an admission that the paragraphs
presently at issue are, indeed, not in controversy between the parties. 1

Only Armstrong’s admission is actually relevant to the determination of this motion.
Since Armstrong has agreed that the remaining paragraphs are not the subject of any present
controversy between the parties, the Church is entitled to judgment on Armstrong’s claim for
declaratory relief. In the alternative, the Court should interpret the provisions of the contract
as a matter of law, on summary judgment rather than an unnecessary bench trial, and grant
the Church summary judgment on the ground that the provisions in question do not "suppress
evidence" or "obstruct justice."

H. THE CHURCH IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT

.As set forth in detail in the moving papers, Armstrong’s complaint for declaratory
relief seeks a declaration as to the validity of nine paragraphs contained in the 1986

1 On Thursday, February 29, 1996, one day before this reply was due to be filed, attorneys for
the Church received a document from Armstrong titled "Armstrong’s Amended Opposition to
Renewal Motion for Summary Judgment of Armstrong’s First Amended Cross-Complaint." This
document is dated "February 26, 1996," and is not file-stamped. Armstrong’s opposing papers
were due to be filed on February 23, 1996, and, if this document was filed with the Court, it
was filed late, and without the Court’s prior permission. The document itself is nothing more
than still another plea for the Court to reconsider its earlier rulings, coupled with unsupported
accusation that the Court "has ignored much evidence, many legal precedents, considerable law
and reasonable logic." [Amended Oppo. at 1] The Church requests that the Court refuse to
consider this late-filed document, pursuant to Marin County Superior Court Rule 3.03(F).

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settlement agreement ("the Agreement"). This Court has already determined that there is no
controversy as to two of the paragraphs, which concern an appeal now ended, or as to an
additional five paragraphs, which this Court has already issued orders enforcing. Only
paragraphs 71 and 18E remain to be interpreted. 2

The Church is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law as to paragraphs 71 and 18E
for two distinct and compelling reasons: (1) no actual controversy exists relating to the legal
rights and duties of the parties with respect to these two paragraphs, and (2) the paragraphs
are valid and enforceable provisions and are not in any sense "designed to suppress evidence
and obstruct justice."

A. No Actual Controversy Exists As To Paragraphs 71 And 18E

Armstrong does not dispute that in order to maintain an action for declaratory relief,
he must do more than simply allege that he and the plaintiff disagree about the terms of a
contract. A real, not a theoretical , controversy must be both alleged and proven. Sherwyn &
Handel v. California State Department of Social Services (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 52, 57, 218
Cal.Rptr. 778, 782; Pittenger v. Home Savings & Loan Assn. (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 32,
37. His opposing papers are silent as to this controlling legal authority. He does, however,
admit that the following facts are undisputed:

+ The only actions pending between the Church and Armstrong are this

2 Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit F, Ruling of December 1, 1995:

As to the first cause of action of defendant’s cross-complaint, plaintiff has
failed to meet its burden of showing that the Court determined the enforceability
of paragraphs 71 and 18E of the settlement agreement. The motions directed at
the fourth, sixth, thirteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth and nineteenth causes of action
only involved paragraph 7D of the settlement agreement. Defendant does not
dispute that "paragraphs 4A and 4B concern an appeal which has already become
final, and as to which no rights, duties or obligations could be enforced in the
future." The order of permanent injunction did not find violations of paragraphs
71 and 18E.

(Citations omitted). The order of permanent injunction specifically found that Armstrong had
violated paragraphs 7D, 7H, 7G, 10, and 18D, and that these provisions were enforceable.
[Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit E at 2:15; 6:21 - 9:3].

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consolidated action and an adversary proceeding filed by the Church in
Armstrong’s bankruptcy (collectively, "the Actions") [Armstrong’s Separate
Statement, No. 5, at 32-33];

+ In the Actions between the Church and Armstrong, the Church has

never tried to specifically enforce paragraphs 71 and 18E of the Settlement
Agreement or to recover damages for breaches of them by Armstrong [Id .,
No. 6, at 33];

+ It is not likely that the Church will seek to enforce paragraphs 71 and

18E of the Settlement Agreement [Id., No. 7, at 33-34].

Under these circumstances, it is obvious that no real controversy exists as to which
this Court should grant declaratory relief. The Church is thus entitled to summary judgment
of the cross-claim as a matter of law.

B. Armstrong is Not Entitled to a Declaration Invalidating Paragraphs 71

And 18E As a Matter of Law

Even if the Court decides that Armstrong’s request for declaratory relief does present
an actual controversy, the Church is still entitled to summary judgment in its favor.
Armstrong does not dispute the controlling principle that "[w]here there is no conflict as to
the terms of a contract, and where its provisions are not uncertain or ambiguous, its
‘meaning and effect * * * and the relation of the parties to it thereby created * * * become a
question of law to be decided by the court.’" Nizuk v. Georges (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 699,
705, 4 Cal.Rptr. 565, 570 (citations omitted). No trial is necessary to determine that
Paragraphs 71 and 18E are valid and enforceable, or that they do not obstruct justice or
suppress evidence as a matter of law.

Paragraph 71 of the Settlement Agreement constitutes a more specific expression of
the parties’ intent, manifested in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6, 3 to mutually release one another for
damages relating to any claims then pending, or injuries known or unknown at the time of

3 See Sep.St. No. 12.

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--

the execution of the Settlement Agreement. The import of this paragraph is simply that, in
the event the parties were to litigate other matters against one another in the future, they
would not re-visit the evidence and issues being resolved in 1986 by the Settlement
Agreement. Nothing in this paragraph obstructs justice or suppresses evidence.

Paragraph 18E of the Settlement Agreement is just an express statement of the
covenant of good faith and fair-dealing which is implied into any contract entered into in
California. When obligations under a contract persist into the future, the parties have a
continuing duty to refrain from taking any action which will deprive the other party of the
benefits of their bargain. The precise terms of Paragraph 18E command and obligate no
more than this, and certainly require no conduct which either "suppresses evidence" or
"obstructs justice."

The Church is thus entitled to judgment declaring that Paragraphs 71 and 18E are
valid and enforceable as a matter of law.

in. CONCLUSION

The Church has provided the Court with two independent and fully-supported bases
on which to base the summary judgment of Armstrong’s cross-complaint in the Church’s
favor. In response, Armstrong has simply refiled papers already considered, argued that the
Court has in the past "misinterpreted" the Agreement, and admitted that the relevant facts are
undisputed. The Church thus requests that the Court enter an order of summary judgment of
the cross-complaint for cross-defendant, Church of Scientology International.

Dated: March 1, 1996 Respectfully Submitted,

WILSON, RYAN & CAMPILONGO

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL

4

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )

) SS.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES )

I am employed in the County of California, State of
California. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a
party to the within action. My business address is 6255 Sunset
Boulevar, Suite 2000, Hollywood, CA 90028.

On March 1, 1996 I served the foregoing document described as
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RENEWAL
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANT GERALD ARMSTRONG'S CROSS¬
COMPLAINT on interested parties in this action,

[ ] by placing the true copies thereof in sealed

envelopes as stated on the attached mailing list;

[X] by placing [ ] the original [X] true copies

thereof in sealed envelopes addressed as follows:

Gerald Armstrong

715 Sir Francis Drake Blvd.

San Anselmo, CA 94960-1949

MICHAEL WALTON

700 Larkspur Landing Circle

Suite 120

Larkspur, CA 94939

[ ] *1 deposited such envelope in the mail at Los
Angeles, California. The envelope was mailed with
postage thereon fully prepaid.

[X] As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the
firm's practice of collection and processing
correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it
would be deposited with U.S. postal service on that
same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los
Angeles, California in the ordinary course of
business. I am aware that on motion of party
served, service is presumed invalid if postal
cancellation date or postage meter date is more
than one day after date of deposit for mailing an
affidavit.

Executed on March 1, 1996, at Los Angeles, California.

[ ] **(BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I delivered such —

envelopes by hand to the offices of the addressees.

Executed on

at

California

[X] (State) I declare under penalty of the laws of
the State of California that the above is true and
correct.

( ] (Federal) I declare that I am employed in the
office of a member of the bar of this court at
whose direction the service was made.

Print or Type Name

* (By Mail, signature must be of person depositing
envelope in mail slot, box or bag)

** (For personal service signature must be that of
messenger)